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Summary
The Takeoff Performance Monitoring System
(TOPMS) has been developed at the Langley Re-
search Center and flight tested on the Transport
System Research Vehicle (TSRV), a highly modified
Boeing 737-100 research airplane. The TOPMS is
a computer software and hardware graphics system
that visually displays current runway position, accel-
eration performance, engine status, and other situ-
ation advisory information to aid pilots in their de-
cision to continue or to abort a takeoff. A total of
55 takeoff and 30 abort situations were investigated
at five airfields. The TOPMS was tested for vat-
ious nominal and off-nominal conditions, including
normal takeoffs; reduced-throttle takeoffs; induced-
acceleration deficiencies; simulated-engine failures;
and several gross-weight, runway-geometry, runway-
surface, and ambient conditions. All tests were made
on dry runways.
Before brake release, the TOPMS algorithm gen-
erated pretakeoff-predicted performance using the
nominal acceleration computed with data for the ex-
isting and/or expected conditions. Then the algo-
rithm computed real-time performance based on
measured acceleration during takeoff and compared
this with the predicted performance. Additionally,
the algorithm provided graphical GO/NO-GO ad-
vice (conveyed by situation advisory flags SAF's)
and continually updated the predicted position of
where the airplane could be braked to a stop.
Full-time symbology depicted the airplane progress
and performance; advisory and predicted stop point
information appeared only when dictated by the
situation.
The TOPMS algorithm was programmed on the
TSRV existing flight displays computer. The air-
plane high-speed digital autonomous terminal access
communication (DATAC) system supplied the algo-
rithm with measured data from the airplane sen-
sots and delivered computed data to drive symbol-
ogy on the airplane electronic display screens. Three
sources of acceleration signals were used during the
test series. The airplane body-mounted accelerome-
ters and a gimballed inertial measuring unit (IMU)
generated satisfactory TOPMS input signals. Part-
way through the TOPMS test series, a strap-down
air data and inertial reference system (ADIRS) pack-
age replaced the IMU on the TSRV. However, the
ADIRS along-track acceleration signal was so noisy
that its use was discontinued after six test runs. (In
postflight analysis, this signal was found to be in-
adequately filtered for use in the runway research
operations conducted in this study.)
The flight tests demonstrated that TOPMS tech-
nology developed on the TSRV B-737 simulator
had been successfullv transferred to the TSRV. The
TOPMS algorithm predicted runway distances with
reasonable accuracy and the displays depicted the
various test conditions and GO/NO-GO advisories
correctly. For example, in six normal takeoff runs,
most of the pretakeoff-predicted and real-time-
computed distances to accelerate the airplane to
takeoff speed agreed to within approximately two
airplane (TSRV) lengths. A ground-based laser
radar tracker at the Wallops Flight Facility continu-
ally measured the TSRV range during two of these
runs and showed that the airplane position when it
reached rotation speed VR was approximately one-
half of an airplane length farther down the runway
than was predicted during pretakeoff computations
and approximately two lengths farther than the dis-
tance computed in real time by the algorithm. Sim-
ilar agreement was obtained for two runs that were
aborted at approximately 80 and 100 knots on dry
pavement. Postflight analysis showed that had the
airplane independently measured ground speed been
the basis of the computed runway distance in the two
executed and two aborted takeoffs, the computed and
measured distances would have been in much closer
agreement.
Introduction
In recent years, airplane safety has shown im-
provement in all segments of flight except during
takeoff or abort situations. According to the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) records,
more than 4000 takeoff-related accidents occurred be-
tween 1983 and 1990 that resulted in 1378 fatalities.
Among large airliners, 8.7 percent of all accidents oc-
cuffed during takeoff or abort situations; for regional
airliners, 12.5 percent occurred during this critical
phase. (See ref. 1.)
Current flight management systems do not com-
prehensively or effectively monitor airplane perfor-
mance on the runway. In particular, they do not
provide pilots with timely knowledge of their mea-
sured along-track acceleration relative to a computed
nominal acceleration based on existing conditions
and standard (i.e., ideal) execution of the takeoff-
roll maneuver. They also do not provide explicit ad-
visory GO/NO-GO decision aids during the takeoff
roll. (See ref. 2.) Thus, many serious takeoff-related
accidents might be precluded or downgraded to rel-
atively safe, low-speed aborted takeoffs if an appro-
priate takeoff performance monitoring system were
available to the flight crew.
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Several performance monitoring systems and pro-
cedures of varying complexities (refs. 3 6) have been
proposed over the years, but none have been im-
plemented and tested on commercial transport air-
craft. The Takeoff Performance Monitoring System
(TOPMS) investigated in the current study was de-
veloped as a computer software and hardware graph-
ics system to assist the pilot in the continual assess-
ment of the takeoff situation. The TOPMS software
drives cockpit displays that graphically indicate take-
off performance relative to a reference performance,
engine condition, and a continually updated predic-
tion of the runway position where the airplane can be
braked to a stop if an aborted takeoff becomes nec-
essary. It also provides explicit GO/NO-GO advice
in the form of situation advisory flags (SAF's).
The TOPMS has been evaluated at the Langley
Research Center in several phases. After a detailed
TOPMS algorithm was formulated and developed in
batch simulations (refs. 7 and 8), initial head-down
display (HDD) graphics were implemented and eval-
uated on the Langley Transport Systems Research
Vehicle (TSRV) real-time, fixed-base B-737 simula-
tor. The TSRV is a highly modified Boeing 737-100
research airplane containing the research flight deck
(aft) inside the fuselage. (See fig. 1.) Figure 2 is a
photograph of the interior of the research flight deck;
figure 3 is a close-up of the primary display (PD) nav-
igational and TOPMS display (Nav/TOPMS), and
the navigation control and display unit (NCDU).
The initial TOPMS displays were evaluated for
content, credibility, and comprehensibility by 32 re-
search, United States Air Force, airline, and in-
dustry pilots. They found that the displays were
easy to monitor and provided valuable safety, per-
formance, and advisory information currently un-
available in commercial cockpits. Additionally, the
pilots suggested minor changes to the HDD graph-
ics and recommended development of a simplified
TOPMS head-up display (HUD) to complement the
HDD. (See ref. 9.) A second simulation study fol-
lowed that incorporated a revised HDD in front of
each pilot and a simplified HUD in front of the Pilot
Flying during takeoff. Seventeen evaluation pilots in
the second study (including eight pilots who partic-
pated in the first study) provided additional insight
into the desirability and importance of particular dis-
play symbology and formats. (See ref. 10.) Sub-
sequently, the HDD graphics were revised further and
the TOPMS was implemented on the TSRV research
flight deck for the flight tests discussed in this report.
The TOPMS flight tests were focused on verifying
that the TOPMS would operate satisfactorily in a
typically noisy airplane operating environment using
preexisting flight computers, sensors, data buses, and
displays. The TOPMS displays were available only
to the pilot in the research flight deck (viz., the
TOPMS Pilot) and only the latest version of the
HDD symbology was tested. The test plan focused
on producing appropriate displays for monitoring a
variety of test conditions. Although most of the data
gathered were qualitative, some numerical data were
obtained during six test situations.
The remainder of this report contains a brief de-
scription of the TOPMS algorithm, a discussion of
the TOPMS HDD symbology and format, photo-
graphs of the displays for various flight conditions,
a description of the flight-test procedures and equip-
ment, presentation and analysis of data (including
pilot comments), and recommendations for further
study.
Symbols
An curve-fit coefficients, n 0, 1, 2, 3 (eq. (2))
a acceleration, ft,/sec 2 (eqs. (1)and (2))
D drag, lb
da takeoff-roll computed distance from
measured acceleration, ft
dgs takeoff-roll computed distance from
measured ground speed, ft
dlt takeoff-roll measured distance from
radar laser tracker, ft
dp takeoff-roll predicted distance from
nominal acceleration, ft
7rt
T
v1
½
lift, lb
mass, slugs
counter, consecutive error band excursions,
n - 5, 8, 10
thrust, lb
critical engine safety CAS (decision
speed), knots
takeoff safety CAS (climbout speed),
knots _
vR
½
W
ttr
rotation CAS, knots
true airspeed, knots
airplane gross weight, lb
coefficient of rolling friction
..
FigureL- Cutaway view of TSRV B-737-I00.
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Figure 2. TSRV research flight deck.
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Figure 3. Displays in front of TOPMS Pilot.
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Figure 4. Functions of TOPMS algorithm.
Abbreviations:
accel, acceleration
ADIRS air-data and inertial reference
system
CAS calibrated airspeed, knots
DATAC digital autonomous terminal access
communication system
EASILY Experimental Avionics System
Integration Laboratory
EPR engine pressure ratio
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
GRLL ground-roll limit line
HDD head-down display
HUD head-up display
IMU inertial measuring unit
NCDU navigaton control and display unit
ND navigation display
PD primary display
SAF situation advisory flag
TAS true airspeed
TOPMS Takeoff Performance Monitoring
System
TSRV Transport Systems Research Vehicle
(B-737-100 class)
Description of TOPMS
The TOPMS is a computer software and hard-
ware graphics system that visually displays engine
status, runway performance, and situation advisory
information to aid pilots with their GO/NO-GO deci-
sion to continue or to abort a takeoff. The TOPMS
algorithm computes and manipulates airplane per-
formance and related data and provides commands
for the color display of both elemental and summary
symbology. The elemental information consists of
pretakeoff-predicted and real-time-measured indica-
tors of performance and their effect on where the air-
plane is expected to reach takeoff speed or where it
could be stopped in an abort situation (with max-
imum braking, but not reverse thrust). The sum-
mary information consists of situation-advisory flags
(SAF's) that alert and advise the pilots when the
takeoff situation has degraded to the degree that it
may be wise to abort or not to abort if insufficient
runway distance is available for stopping the airplane
on the runway pavement.
Algorithm
The TOPMS algorithm consists of two segments:
a pretakeoff segment and a real-time segment as in-
dicated by the block diagram in figure 4. The _algo-
rithm is briefly described in the next two sections;
a detailed description of its development is given in
references 7 and 8.
Pretakeoff calculations. When activated dur-
ing pretakeoff, the algorithm obtains and uses nom-
inal and/or current values for several key parame-
ters (table I); checks for system anomalies such as
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misconfiguredflapsor inconsistentinput data; and
determinescheduledvaluesforenginepressureratio
(EPR),criticalenginesafetyspeedV1 (also called de-
cision speed), rotation speed VR, and takeoff safety
speed 1/2. The algorithm extracts values for these pa-
rameters from data files that contain pertinent tables
from the airplane flight manual.
Table I. Pretakeoff Inputs
to TOPMS Algorithm
Airplane center of gravity
Airplane gross weight
Airplane flap setting
Pressure altitude
Wind direction
Wind speed
Ambient temperature
Runway rolling friction coefficient
Using data from detailed mathematical models
of the engines, landing gear, and aerodynamics for
the host airplane, nominal values for the parameters
listed in table I, and the appropriate EPR value
for existing conditions, the algorithm calculates a
predicted nominal acceleration performance of the
airplane for the planned takeoff. It also predicts
where V1 and V/t should occur during a nominal
takeoff roll and warns the pilot when the length of the
assigned runway appears too short for the planned
takeoff.
The nominal performance is represented by a
curve of nominal acceleration versus true airspeed VT
generated from equations (1) and (2) and plotted
with an appropriate curve-fitting method. Equa-
tion (1) defines the nominal acceleration during the
takeoff roll as
T-D #r(W L)
a - (1)
m
where the airplane approximate gross weight W is
known, the rolling-friction coefficient #r is estimated
for the perceived runway surface condition, the values
of lift L and drag D are obtained by the algorithm
from the aerodynamics mathematical model, and
thrust T is computed from the engine model for a
typical throttle-movement history from idle to the
position of scheduled EPR.
The same acceleration as a cubic polynomial in VT
which is fitted to the equation (1) curve through
the coefficients An of the powers of VT (where
n -- 0, 1, 2, 3) is expressed as
a - Ao + A1VT + A2V:_ + A3VT 3 (2)
The conversion process involves the following steps"
.
.
o
Equation (1) is solved using an extremely low
value of/_r -0.005 and nominal values for other
conditions over the takeoff speed range. The
resulting curve (after engine spool-up transients
settle out) is plotted as the upper boundary in
figure 5 over a speed range from approximately
10 knots to VR speed.
Equation (1) is solved again for an extremely
high value of Pr 0.04 and plotted as the lower
boundary in figure 5 over the same speed range.
Equation (2) is fitted to each of the above curves
using the sum of least-squares error method.
As shown in figure 5, the correlation using this
method is excellent (the computed and fitted
curves for each value of #r essentially lie on top
of each other).
The two sets of curve-fit coefficients are then
stored where the algorithm can access them
when subsequently creating a nominal accelera-
tion curve corresponding to any estimated value
of #r - 0.005 to 0.040.
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Figure 5. Acceleration curves for extreme values of #r.
A representative nominal acceleration curve for a
dry surface (pr -0.015) is plotted as a solid line in
figure 6. This curve is created by linear interpolation
of the two sets of curve-fit coefficients obtained above.
After the curve-fitting process is complete, the pre-
takeoff segment nominal performance parameters are
transferred to the real-time segment, as shown in fig-
ure 4. This process is treated in considerable detail
in reference 8.
Real-time calculations. A block diagram por-
traying real-time operations is shown in figure 7.
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Figure 6. Nominal acceleration for dry runway surface.
#r -- 0.015.
The functions performed by most of the blocks are
self-explanatory; the measured inputs enter from the
left and the computer-estimated outputs emerge at
the right. At low speeds, the algorithm uses mea-
sured ground speed and wind to compute airspeed;
then at approximately 40 knots, the airplane real-
time-computed airspeed becomes valid and replaces
airspeed derived from integrated ground speed by
means of the software switch shown at the left cen-
ter of figure 7. During the test runs, airplane posi-
tions on the runway were determined from distances
traveled calculated by double integration of measured
accelerations (method I). During postflight analysis
(only), single integration of the independently mea-
sured ground speed provided another means of deter-
mining airplane position (method 2 is shown by the
dashed line at the top of fig. 7).
The real-time segment of the algorithm is acti-
vated when the pilot advances the throttles forward
from idle. As the airplane rolls down the runway,
the distance traveled and the distances required to
reach I/1 and V R are continually computed using
sensor-measured values for the parameters shown in
table II.
Table II. Additional Real-Time Inputs
to TOPMS Algorithm
Left and right engine pressure ratios
Left and right throttle positions
Airplane flap settings
Airplane accelerations
Airplane ground speed
Calibrated airspeed
Ground
speed _i 2d-order
Accel. .._ comp. filter
yl
Wind _ Computespee ,.- AS
CAS .._[ 1st-order"- lag filt r
1st-orderEPR _ lag filter
Throttle ,._[ 1st-order
"-I lag filter
timated ground s__peed __ __
1st-order
lag filter _
Single
integration
Double
integration
Estimated acceleration
Nominal and
reference
performance
stim__atedrunw__ay po___sitio___n:me__thod2
Estimated runway position: method 1_
Convert
CAS to TAS
Compute
acceleration
Predict EPR
SAF
r
SAF
logic
mated distance to V 11
i ] [ -Estimated distance to VR
1 Estimated distance to stop
r
Engine health
check
,,..-
y
y
Engkne
Figure 7. Algorithm real-time functions.
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The algorithm also creates a reference accelera-
tion curve in real time in the following manner:
1. While the throttles are being advanced and/or
adjusted, a reference acceleration is computed
from equation (1) using thrust values associated
with the sensed EPR and otherwise nominal input
data.
2. As soon as the throttles are set (i.e., become sta-
tionary for more than 3 sec), the algorithm makes
a one-time #r adjustment to the reference accel-
eration curve by forcing the reference accelera-
tion value at a given true airspeed to match that
of the measured acceleration. This adjustment
is achieved by appropriately changing the value
of A0 in equation (2).
3. The algorithm also makes a one-time adjustment
to the along-track component of the wind. Af-
ter the calibrated airspeed CAS measurement be-
comes valid, an along-track component of the
wind is calculated from measured ground speed
and CAS; this value is then substituted for the
initial value for the remainder of the takeoff.
As indicated above, the #r- and wind-error ad-
justments are programmed to execute only once per
run. However, each time the throttles are moved ap-
preciably, the algorithm adjusts the reference acceler-
ation curve according to the EPR levels it associates
with each newly measured throttle position.
Throttle movements and settings that differ from
those assumed when the nominal acceleration curve
was created are not treated by the TOPMS algorithm
as error conditions; instead, they produce a reference
acceleration curve that is parallel to the nominal
acceleration curve. In particular, during a low-
throttle takeoff, the displays will not indicate an
engine problem and SAF's will not appear if the
remaining runway distance will accommodate the
extended takeoff. The algorithm could be rewritten
to treat off-nominal throttle settings as an error; but
because such an error is easily corrected by moving
the throttles, low-throttle settings probably should
not be included in the abort criteria.
The algorithm real-time segment continually com-
putes the difference between measured acceleration
and reference acceleration. If the magnitude of the
resulting error signal exceeds a specified level, an
abort SAF is displayed. (Refer to "Data Analysis
and Results" for additional comments.)
Display Format and Symbology
Figure 3 is a close-up of the displays in the TSRV
aft research flight deck. The upper primary display
(PD) screen provides attitude, altitude, and speed
information. The existing PD system configuration
was used without modification for the TOPMS tests.
The navigation display (ND) in the center of the
photograph presents either TOPMS information
while the airplane is on the ground or regular navi-
gational information after the airplane becomes air-
borne. The keypad on the unit below the ND screen
is used to enter data into the airplane comput:,ers.
The TOPMS display consists of a runway graphic
with passive and active symbology on and around
it. Figure 8 illustrates the display for two situations:
the takeoff-roll display (fig. 8(a)) shows a takeoff roll
under way in which acceleration performance has
become unsatisfactory and an abort is being advised
and the abort display (fig. 8(b)) shows a takeoff roll in
which an abort has been initiated and partial braking
is under way.
The takeoff-roll situation illustrated in figure 8(a)
shows the airplane about halfway down a 6000-ft run-
way traveling at a CAS of 97 knots (displayed in the
box left of the airplane symbol). Pretakeoff com-
putations for this case were based on nominal ac-
celeration and the algorithm predicted that a deci-
sion speed V1 of 126 knots and a rotation speed VR
of 128 knots could be achieved near the unshaded
triangle. However, during the takeoff roll, actual
acceleration was considerably below nominal, which
caused the horizontal 1/1 and VR lines and the shaded
triangle to move forward. Specifically, the position
of the V_ line corresponds to the computed along-
track position of the shaded triangle apex. This
forward movement of the shaded triangle is an in-
direct but, nevertheless, an important indication of
the acceleration deficiency.
The algorithm initially determines whether a Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA) sanctioned take-
off (ref. 11) can be expected; it computes whether the
airplane can achieve V/_ before it reaches the ground-
roll limit line (GRLL). The GRLL marks the further-
most downfield position where the airplane, after
undergoing a critical engine failure at 1/1, can ini-
tiate rotation and barely clear a 35-ft barrier at the
end of the runway. The minimum takeoff field length
is the total distance required to reach V_ plus the
ground and air distance beyond V/? for completing
the takeoff described above.
For the situation illustrated in figure 8(a), the
ground and air distance beyond V/_ is subtracted
from total runway length (6000 ft) to establish the
location of the GRLL. Note that a takeoff-roll safety
margin of approximately 500 ft is evident between the
apex of the shaded triangle (viz., the V_ line) and the
m
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(a) Takeoff-roll display. (b) Abort display.
Figure 8. TOPMS takeoff-roll and abort-display symbology.
GRLL. The GRLL has no direct relationship to the
bottom of the EPR bars; they were arbitrarily based
at the GRLL on the display format.
In the off-nominal situation depicted in figure 8(a),
both engines appear to be operating normally. The
EPR bars are extended up to the target level, but
the shaded triangle and the V1 and V R lines have
moved noticeably forward from their nominal loca-
tions depicted by the unshaded triangle. The algo-
rithm has determined that an abort may be the most
appropriate control action for this situation and the
display conveys this advice to the pilot by means of
the STOP SAF that appears at the end of the runway
graphic. At the same time, an x appears just beyond
the GRLL and shows where the airplane will come
to a stop with maximum application of the wheel
brakes and full deployment of the spoilers (i.e., speed
brakes). Normally, the x remains hidden until the
computed stop point is beyond the GRLL; when an
abort is advised, the x is unmasked simultaneously
with the appearance of the STOP sign. The benefit
of using reverse thrust is not included in the calcula-
tion of the x position; however, reverse thrust can be
used to advantage in situations where both engines
appear to be working satisfactorily. (See fig. 8.)
Figure 8(b) shows the TOPMS display after an
abort has been initiated. All takeoff-related infor-
mation has been removed from the runway graphic
except the airplane symbol, which shows position on
the runway; ground speed, which replaces C,AS in the
speed box; and the ×, which locates the maximum-
braking stop point. An additional symbol, shaped
like a football, has appeared that denotes the pre-
dieted stop point based on the measured acceleration.
Less than maximum braking is required whenever the
football position is ahead of the x.
Summary of Situation Advisory Flags
A summary of SAF responses based on sensor
data during various flight situations is shown in
TableIII. Shapes,Colors,andConditionsfortheSAF's
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SAF shape
No flag
Rectangular
Triangular
Octagonal
Green
SAF color
Amber (blinking)
Red
Flight situation (sensor input)
1. Takeoff roll proceeding satisfactorily
2. No engines failed; airplane can attain VR before reaching
GRLL but stopping on runway doubtful
3. One engine failed when CAS > V1; airplane can attain VR
before reaching GRLL but stopping on runway doubtful
4. One engine failed at CAS > V1; airplane can attain V_
well before reaching GRLL or can easily stop on runway
5. One engine failed at CAS < V1
6. Both engines failed
7. Predicted rotation point beyond GRLL
8. Measured along-track acceleration not within the
specified error band about the reference acceleration
Advisory
GO
GO
GO
EITHER
NO-GO
NO-GO
NO-GO
NO-GO
i _:_ _ii i!'
_!/i_ ii
table III. The absence of an SAF indicates that
the takeoff is proceeding normally and/or airplane
parameters are staying within acceptable error
bands. Flight situation 4 informed the pilot at a
critical high-speed point that an engine had failed
and that adequate runway distance remains to stop
the airplane if the GO option suddenly became un-
reasonable (e.g., when smoke is rapidly engulfing the
cabin).
Displays for Several Takeoff and Abort
Situations
No still photographs of the displays were made
during actual flight tests. Instead, all photographs
except those in figures 1, 2, and 3 were recreated
in a Langley special-purpose test facility, the Ex-
perimental Avionics System Integration Laboratory
(EASILY). In essence, EASILY is a hot-bench ex-
tension of the flight test bed. It contains dupli-
cates of the actual flight hardware and software along
with a high-fidelity, nonlinear computer model of the
Boeing 737-100 the same model as the TRSV used
during the TOPMS simulation studies. (See refs. 9
and 10.)
Pretakeoff Displays
If the positions of the flaps do not agree with the
nominal position specified for the pretakeoff calcula-
tions, the partially generated TOPMS display shown
in figure 9 will appear on the screen. No additional
TOPMS graphics are generated until the flap lever is
put in the proper detent and the flaps move to the
commanded position.
L-92-02984
Figure 9. TOPMS display with flaps in wrong position.
If the length of the assigned runway is shorter
than the minimum distance determined by the algo-
rithm, a TOPMS display similar to the one in fig-
ure 10 will appear. Note that the apex of the VR tri-
angle is well beyond the GRLL (horizontal line across
the runway symbol), which causes a STOP sign to
appear that advises the pilot not to start the takeoff
roll.
If the runway length is long enough, the flaps
are correctly set, and the conditions are otherwise
normal, a fully generated pretakeoff TOPMS display
10
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L-92-02985
Figure 10. TOPMS display when assigned runway too short.
to span the entire usable vertical range of the dis-
play screen. At this stage, the TOPMS is ready for
the takeoff roll to begin. (The zero-length EPR bars
depicting idle thrust are not perceptible in fig. 11.)
Takeoff-Roll Displays
Photographs of representative displays for several
flight situations are presented in figures 12 19.
Normal takeoff roll. Figure 12 shows a typical
TOPMS display during a normal takeoff roll on a
6000-ft-long runway. The airplane is traveling at
a CAS of 83 knots. Note that the top ends of
both EPR bars match their target levels (1.95) and
that the VR triangles have not separated. Under
such conditions, the pilot can expect to reach VR
approximately halfway down the runway and the
monitoring tasks would primarily be to keep track of
airspeed and occasionally to glance at the VR triangle
and EPR bars. The pilot can monitor airspeed
by watching the numerals in the speed box or by
observing the closure of the moving CAS line on the
near-stationary V1 line. The pilot can also keep the
analog display of airspeed within peripheral vision
range while continuing to focus on the real-world
runway scene.
L-92-02986
Figure 11. TOPMS display when ready to begin takeoff.
similar to the graphic shown in figure 11 will appear.
This graphic shows where V1 of 122 knots and VR
of 124 knots should occur with respect to the air-
plane initial position on the runway. (For viewing
clarity, the computed airplane position is depicted
by the nose of the airplane graphic.) The length of
the assigned runway (6000 ft) and the point where
the takeoff roll will start have been entered; the algo-
rithm has scaled the corresponding runway graphic
L-92-Q_2987
Figure 12. TOPMS display when normal takeoff under way.
If an engine were to fail before the airplane
reaches V1 (during an otherwise normal takeoff situ-
ation), it would produce a head-down TOPMS dis-
play similar to the one shown in figure 3. In this in-
_..
._
stance, the right engine has failed at approximately
100 knots and the display is conveying an abort SAF
11
(STOPsign)to thepilot. Additionally,thealgorithm
hasdeterminedthat for animmediateabortanduse
of maximumbraking,theairplanecanbestoppedat
the x shownabouthalfwaydownthe6000-ftrunway.
Low-throttle takeoff roll. Figure 13 shows the
TOPMS display for a situation in which the throttles
were not advanced to the nominal position for attain-
ing scheduled EPR (selected during pretakeoff by the
algorithm from the database programmed from the
TSRV flight manual). The shaded triangle has moved
forward nearly 1000 ft from its initial location where
it had been superimposed on the unshaded triangle.
If the shaded triangle remains stationary at this new
position, it signifies that thrust is correct for the ac-
tual throttle setting and no acceleration error exists.
The throttles can be advanced to reduce this separa-
tion or the takeoff roll can be continued at reduced
thrust with the expectation of a satisfactory takeoff.
In alternate form, the algorithm could respond to
the low-throttle settings with error condition graph-
ics; this was not the choice in any of the TOPMS
studies. (See refs. 7 10 and 12.)
L-92-02997
Figure 13. TOPMS display with throttle set lower than
scheduled.
Engine failure during low-throttle takeoff
roll. If an engine fails during a reduced-thrust
takeoff-roll situation, the TOPMS display will be
similar to the graphic shown in figure 14. An engine
failure is declared by the algorithm when the engine
EPR has degraded by more than a specified amount
(10 percent in this study) from the value normally
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L-92-03001
Figure 14. TOPMS display for engine failure during reduced-
throttle takeoff.
produced for the measured throttle position. For the
situation in figure 14, the under-advanced throttles
are commanding both engines to produce EPR's of
approximately 1.7 rather than the scheduled 1.95.
The left engine is apparently producing the com-
manded EPR value of 1.7; however, the EPR bar
for the failed right engine is clearly less than 90 per-
cent of the length of the apparently correct left EPR
bar and has turned red. Concurrently, a red SAF
(STOP sign) and a predicted stop point × have ap-
peared and the V/_ triangles have separated by more
than 1000 ft. If the performance of the faulty engine
degrades further, the shaded triangle will continue
to advance toward the GRLL. At this stage, take-
off is still a viable option; however, NO-GO is the
control action recommended by the TOPMS before
airplane speed increases further and the remaining
runway distance becomes more marginal.
Engine failure at high speed. If an engine
failure occurs near 1/1 on a relatively short runway,
as shown in figure 15, the SAF is displayed as a large
green rectangle at the end of the runway graphic.
This symbol advises the pilot that the _est option
is to continue with the takeoff because a maximum-
braking stop would likely terminate near or beyond
the end of the runway pavement. (See the x in
fig. 15.) Also, note in figure 15 that the current
CAS 124 knots is greater than the decision speed
V1 120 knots, which is an overriding condition that
warrants continuation of the takeoff.
L-92-03000
Figure15.TOPMSdisplayforenginefailurenear1/1onshort
runway.
L-92-02996
Figure16.TOPMSdisplayforenginefailureaftereaching1/1
onverylongrunway.
If asimilarsituationwereencounteredona very
longrunway,the TOPMSwouldexhibita blinking
triangularGO/NO-GOSAF like the oneshownin
figure 16. The blinking amberSAF signifiesthat
an enginehasfailedat or above1/1and that the
two viablecontroloptions includecontinuingthe
takeoffascurrentlyrequiredbyregulations(ref.11)
orundertakingadangeroushigh-speedabort(e.g.,in
a perceivedcriticalemergencysuchasfireor smoke
in the cabin). For the situationin figure 16, the
predictedmaximum-brakingstoppoint x is about
6000ft downthe 10000-ftrunway.
Excess drag versus EPR sensor error. As-
certaining whether excessive drag and/or large EPR
sensor errors are causing significantly lower than
nominal performance involves the following condition
checks by the algorithm:
1. Engine performance is checked. A failing en-
gine produces lower than scheduled EPR and a
correspondingly lower acceleration level. When
the EPR error for this engine becomes un-
acceptable (i.e., the measured EPR level differs
bv more than 10 percent from the EPR level as-
sociated with the measured throttle position), the
algorithm changes the color of the shortened EPR
bar to red and displays the appropriate SAF. (See
fig. 3.) If the pilot chooses not to abort immedi-
ately, the algorithm will continue to provide infor-
mation on the magnitude and trend of the accel-
eration deficiency by the position and movement
of the shaded triangle and on the EPR condition
of the unfailed engine by the length and color of
its associated EPR bar.
2. If no engine has failed and the throttles have
a lower than nominal setting (fig. 13), the EPR
bars will accordingly stop short of their target
mark, but they will not change color. The shaded
triangle will also move noticeably forward; no
SAF will be displayed unless the triangle moves
beyond the GRLL.
3. If the EPR bars rise to and remain at their sched-
uled target level without changing color and the
shaded triangle continually drifts forward, the in-
dication is that drag is increasing faster than it
should for the other conditions (i.e., wind, tem-
perature, weight, etc.). The situation is illus-
trated in figure 17. When the incremental drag
becomes excessive, causing the acceleration error
to exceed the acceptable level of 10 percent, a red
SAF (STOP sign) will appear as shown in fig-
ure 18. However, if one or both EPR bars turn
red while remaining at the target length, a serious
EPR sensor error exists and a red SAF will appear
as shown in figure 19. Note in this figure that the
shaded triangle has also crossed the GRLL, thus
satisfying another abort criterion (situation 7 in
table IV). A relevant, real-world situation that re-
sulted from an EPR sensor error is discussed in a
later section of this report.
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L-92-02994
Figure17.TOPMSdisplaywith acceptableacceleration
deficiency.
L-92-02988
Figure18.TOPMSdisplaywithunacceptableacceleration
performance.
Abort Displays
Figure20 showsphotographsof abort displays
for three situations. Each displaycontainstwo
computer-predictedstoppoint symbols the x that
is carriedover from the takeoffdisplayand the
football-shapedsymbolthat appearson therunway
14
L-91-15892
Figure19.TOPMSdisplaywithseriousdisagreement
betweeni dicatedandmeasuredEPR's.
graphicassoonasthebrakesareapplied.Thefoot-
ball locateswherethe stoppoint will be basedon
the currentlycomputedposition,speed,and mea-
suredacceleration.Thedisplayin figure20(a)shows
thefootballaheadofthe x, whichindicatesthat less
than full brakingis beingapplied. Thedisplayin
figure20(b)showsthefootballsuperimposedonthe
x, whichindicatesthat full brakingisbeingapplied.
Thedisplayin figure20(c)indicatesthat full brak-
ingandreversethrust arebeingappliedto stopthe
airplaneslightlybeforethe x isreached.
Test Equipment
The TSRV is a productionprototypeBoeing
737-100airplane(fig. 1)with its fuselagefilledwith
numerouscomputers,recorders,data-transfersys-
tems,andthe aft researchflight deckthat permit
the useand evaluationof advancedelectronicdis-
playsandfly-by-wirecontrols. A TOPMSdisplay
wasnotprovidedin theTSRVforwardregularflight
deck;brakecontrolsandHUD werenot providedin
theresearchflightdeck.Becauseof theseequipment
limitations,the TOPMSwasremotelytestedin the
HDDmodeonly.
A functionalblockdiagramof the testhardware
is shownin figure21. Althoughthe TOPMSPilot
and TOPMS displayswerelocatedremotely,the
procedureswereset up to simulatea side-by-side,
real-worldpilotingsituation.TheTOPMSPilot and
thePilot Flyingcommunicatedby intercom.
Test situation a
1. Normal
2. Low-thrust setting
3. Low, then normal thrust
4. Large #r-error correction
5. Large wind-error correction
6. Intentional
7. Unacceptable acceleration
deficiency
8. Simulated engine failure
Totals
Table IV. Number of Runs at Various Test Situations
Runs with IMU
Takeoffs
Aborts
Runs with
ADIRS used
on test day
4A
Runs with
body-mounted
accelerometer
used on test day
Total
4B / 5 / 6 1 runs -
26
13
3
10
17
aTest situations:
1. In addition to normal takeoffs at the test sites, data were obtained for all takeoffs going to and returning from these
sites; consequently, approximately 30 percent of the runs listed in Table IV were normal takeoffs.
2. Low-thrust takeoffs were made with EPR settings of 1.6 and 1.7 rather than the nominal EPR settings of 1.88 to 1.95.
3. These runs were begun with significantly lower than nominal throttle settings; during the takeoff roll, the Pilot Flying
deliberately moved the throttles up and down several times so the TOPMS Pilot could observe the response of the
shaded triangle as it continually updated the position for reaching VR.
4, 5. One-time adjustments to pr and the head wind were automatically made (if necessary) on all runs. However, to make
this feature noticeable to the TOPMS Pilot, intentionally large #r and wind errors were manually entered for several
pretakeoff computations. Subsequent throttle adjustments translated to the display as small movements of the shaded
triangle each time the throttles were reset and remained stationary for more than 3 see.
6. Three runs were intentionally aborted and the airplane was stopped with maximum-braking application; the laser
tracker at the Wallops Flight Facility tracked the airplane during two of the stops.
7. Ten takeoff rolls were made with the spoilers fully deployed to create excess drag as airplane speed increased. In
response, the shaded triangle was observed to creep forward until the resulting acceleration error tripped the abort
SAF. (See fig. 18.)
8. Engine failures were simulated when the Safety Pilot appropriately moved one throttle to artificially induce an EPR
discrepancy. For this test only, the algorithm compared the EPR value associated with the current deflected throttle
position and its initial target value. Such failures were detected by the TOPMS Pilot as a shrinking red EPR bar and
an accompanying abort SAF. (.See fig. 3.)
15
16
(a) Partial braking.
L-92-02989
L-92-02991
(b) Full braking, except no reverse thrust.
L-92-02992
(c) Full braking, including reverse thrust.
Figure 20. TOPMS displays for three braking levels.
The TOPMS software was programmed on the
Norden 11,/70 displays computer console (fig. 1)
along with the software for the other airplane dis-
plays. Except for a video camera and an additional
remote display screen, no extra hardware had to
be installed to document the real-time performance
of the TOPMS displays under the various test sit-
uations. Research observations and conversations
among the pilots, the flight director, and the con-
trol tower were recorded on the audio channel of the
videotapes.
The TOPMS interfaced with the flight decks, sen-
sors, and other experimental equipment through the
airplane global digital autonomous terminal access
communication (DATAC)data b_s. (See ref. 13.)
In addition, a ground-based FPS-16 Radar/Laser
Tracker (ref. 14) at the Wallops Flight Facility was
used to track the airplane during several of the test
runs; it independently provided distance measure-
ments as functions of time. Subsequently, these data
were time merged with the data recorded onboard
the airplane, which permitted a comparison of mea-
sured and computed stop distances. Sixteen channels
of strip-chart data were monitored during the test
runs to verify in real time that a test run appeared
to be proceeding properly. In addition, approxi-
mately 60 airplane and TOPMS parameters were dig-
itally recorded at a rate of 20 samples per second for
postflight scrutiny and analysis.
Description of Flight Tests
Six days of flight testing were conducted between
March 1987 and November 1989 at the Wallops
Flight Facility and the Langley Air Force Base in
Virginia, the Kennedy Space Center Shuttle Landing
Facility and the Patrick Air Force Base in Florida,
and the Asheville Regional Airport in North Car-
olina. Tt_e test runs included 55 takeoff and 30 abort
situations. All were made on dry pavements rang-
ing from slurry-sealed asphalt to highly grooved con-
crete. During the test series, temperatures ranged
from approximately 25 ° to 85°F and gross weights
varied from heavy to light depending on the amount
of fuel onboard.
Flight Test Crew
As indicated in figure 21, the TOPMS fl_ght-test
crew consisted of a Pilot Flying who controlled the
airplane from the left seat of the TSRV regular flight
deck, a TOPMS Pilot who monitored the TOPMS
displays in the research flight deck and communi-
cated with the Pilot Flying by the intercom, and a
Safety Pilot who occupied the right seat in the TSRV
regular flight deck and participated minimally in the
TOPMS
Pilot
Pilot
Flying
Safety
Pilot
Researchcockpit
TOPMS
displays
Regular
cockpit
displays
Regularcockpit
NCDU
Flight
and
displays
computers
I
I
Control {
input
devices
I
Sensors
i
Control
systems
Engines t
- Brakes
- Control
surfaces
+
Airplane
dynamics
Figure 21. Functional block diagram of test: system.
test program. (During a checkout flight, a 4-in moni-
tor was temporarily mounted in the center console of
the TSRV regular flight deck for the Safety Pilot to
observe; however, it was too small to be useful and
was removed before the actual test flights began.)
Acceleration Measurements
Three airplane along-track acceleration signals
were available of which one was selected for in-
put to the algorithm during the test and two refer-
ence accelerations were generated by the algorithm.
During pretakeoff, a nominal acceleration curve for
#r- 0.015 (fig. 6) was generated for initial predic-
tions of where particular performance events would
occur based on existing and/or expected conditions.
Then, during the takeoff roll, a reference accelera-
tion curve was generated to reflect input deviations
such as higher or lower than nominal throttle setting,
wind, and #r updates.
During the six days of testing, measured along-
track acceleration signals were obtained from the
airplane inertial measuring unit (IMU), which was
available during the first three test days; an air
data and inertial reference system (ADIRS), which
replaced the IMU for part of the fourth test day;
and the airplane body-mounted x-axis accelerometer,
which was available for all test days but was used as
a TOPMS input only during the last 2.5 test days.
Pitch compensation was appropriately added to each
of the measured along-track acceleration signals to
account for the 1° inclination of the TSRV body
x-axis to the runway surface and to accommodate
the takeoff rotation.
After a few runs on the fourth test day (ta-
ble IV), the ADIRS along-track acceleration signal
was discarded in favor of the body-mounted x-axis
acceleration signal. As is discussed later in "Re-
sults," the along-track acceleration signal from the
TSRV ADIRS unit was found to be atypical of the
high-quality, filtered acceleration signals available on
modern airplanes.
Before the actual test runs, the TSRV was
taxied at moderate speed down a runway at the
Wallops Flight Facility while the Safety Pilot called
off 1000-ft-to-go markers as the airplane physically
passed them; the TOPMS Pilot, having no outside
view, made similar calls when he observed the nose
of the TOPMS airplane symbol pass corresponding
1000-ft tick marks along the edge of the runway
graphic. The correlation was good; consequently, the
test series proceeded as planned. A second opportu-
nity for this type of calibration check occurred at the
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sPatrick Air Force Base on the third test day. Those
results were similarly good.
Test Runs
Eighty-five test runs (55 takeoff and 30 abort
situations) were made with the TSRV. The test
conditions and runs are summarized in table IV.
In addition to the test situations listed in ta-
ble IV, incorrect and inconsistent data were inten-
tionally entered for the pretakeoff calculations to
demonstrate that the algorithm was configured to
detect unscheduled flap settings, out-of-range or in-
consistent inputted data, and runway lengths that
were less than the minimum required for the takeoff.
Erroneous data were purposely entered at the begin-
ning of each test day; the resulting TOPMS displays
(figs. 9 and 10) were observed several times by the
TOPMS Pilot.
Because of tire and brake wear and the potential
dangers associated with high-speed aborts, the flight
test situations were designed so that most of them
were terminated as takeoffs. For example, after an
abort SAF (STOP sign) appeared for several seconds
during deficient acceleration runs created by full de-
ployment of spoilers during the takeoff roll, the Test
Director declared an end to the run; the Pilot Fly-
ing lowered the spoilers and completed a preplanned
takeoff. In situations which simulated engine failures,
the STOP sign appeared and was observed briefly by
the TOPMS Pilot who then instructed the Pilot Fly-
ing to complete another preplanned takeoff. As a
consequence of such test procedures, the symbology
for takeoff-roll and abort situations was sufficiently
exercised and observed by the TOPMS Pilot. All
TOPMS displays were recorded on videotape, but
very few complete sets of numerical test data were
obtained.
Data Analysis and Results
The primary results from the TOPMS flight tests
were observations of the display responses to vari-
ous operational and environmental conditions. The
displays were monitored in real time by all three au-
thors and by the TOPMS Pilot who provided the
evaluation comments that follow.
Comments by TOPMS Project Pilot
In the opinion of the TOPMS Pilot who had
served as the TOPMS Project Pilot since the be-
ginning of the simulation evaluation studies (refs. 9,
10, and 12), a highly successful transfer of TOPMS
technology was made from the TSRV B-737 simu-
lator to the TSRV airplane. The pilot further in-
dicated that the displays observed in this study per-
formed like those evaluated in the simulation studies.
Other comments and observations are paraphrased as
follows:
The TOPMS on-line pretakeoff calculations
that yielded the values of velocities 1/1, VR,
and 1/2 and scheduled EPR were done quickly
and precisely. They yielded the same values
as those that the Pilot Flying obtained from
the TSRV flight manual for each of the vari-
ous conditions. In addition, the algorithm ap-
peared to correctly position the performance
triangle on the runway graphic at the location
where V1 and VR would be reached.
During normal takeoffs, setting the throttles
according to the scheduled EPR bars produced
the proper accelerations needed for the ana-
log airplane graphic to reach the shaded per-
formance triangle at its pretakeoff-predicted
location (i.e., the two triangles remained
superimposed). This performance inspired
confidence in the ability of the algorithm
to provide good position information in
off-nominal situations.
Deviations from nominal values of weight,
thrust, and drag yielded the expected re-
sponses in the performance of the TOPMS
analog display elements (viz., the airplane
symbol, CAS line, shaded triangle, EPR bars,
and continually updated stop points). In
most situations, response changes could be
attributed to improper throttle setting or to
some other cause.
The SAF's report the algorithm overall anal-
ysis of the situation. Hopefully, the pilots
would make the same GO/NO-GO decision
without the aid of the SAF, although in some
situations the decision might not be made as
quickly. If the decision were NO-GO, the ear-
lier in the takeoff roll that it is made, the easier
and safer the abort will be.
In a sense, the SAF's act as a prompter to
alert the TOPMS Pilot to quickly scan the
distributed information for substantiation of
the GO or NO-GO advisory before announcing
a recommendation to the Pilot Flying. In
turn, the Pilot Flying should be able to make
an earlier and more confident decision.
Whereas the issue of providing pilots with
SAF's and associated activation logic may
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be somewhat controversial, the TOPMS al-
gorithm has demonstrated flexibility in re-
gard to if, when, and how such advisories
are presented. Some or all of the SAF's
can be omitted without significantly or ad-
versely affecting the more fundamental distrib-
uted information (e.g., information on the ac-
celeration performance trend provided by the
triangles).
The amber SAF should be removed from con-
sideration; it appears on the screen at a critical
time when new advice is inappropriate.
During abort situations, transition from the
takeoff display to the abort display with throt-
tle retardation was very quick, smooth, and
comprehensible. No visual continuity was lost
and no mental reorientation was required.
The correlation was good between the foot-
ball symbol (instantaneously predicted stop
point) and perceived deceleration during both
maximum- and partial-braking maneuvers.
The displays for all runs were recorded on video-
tape for later viewing and correlation with the
recorded numerical data and oral comments.
Acceleration Comparisons
In addition to the pilot conversations and com-
ments, several performance variables were recorded
for use in real-time and postflight analyses. These
analyses involved acceleration time-history compar-
isons and continual determination of the airplane po-
sition on the runway based on several measurement
and computational techniques.
Figure 22 shows an example of the along-track ac-
celeration measured by the ADIRS sensor unit. Also
shown is the reference acceleration that was com-
puted by the algorithm for a normal takeoff roll under
the same conditions. The ADIRS-measured accelera-
tion signal was oscillatory within a moderately large
envelope. (Subsequently it was judged to be a poor
representation of the actual airplane acceleration.)
This oscillation which caused some unexpected SAF
display problems is illustrated in figures 22 24. The
algorithm one-time adjustment of the magnitude of
the reference acceleration to that of the measured
acceleration came at a time (approximately 19 sec
into the takeoff roll) when the ADIRS curve was in
one of its valleys; consequently, the algorithm de-
manded a large step change in the reference accel-
eration curve to match that of the ADIRS-measured
acceleration. Figure 23 shows an enlargement of the
figure 22 curves in the adjustment region. After the
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Figure 22. Comparison of TOPMS reference and ADIRS
along-track-acceleration signals during normal takeoff roll.
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Figure 23. Enlargement of figure 22 reference acceleration
adjustment.
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Figure 24. Abort flag occurrences due to ADIRS along-track-
acceleration signal excursions outside +10-percent error
band (n- 5).
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stepchange,thereferenceaccelerationcurvecontin-
uesalonga pathparallelto its originalpath (unless
thethrottlesareagainmovedoranenginefails).No-
tice that the correctedreferencecurveskirtsalong
thebottomboundaryratherthan throughthemid-
dleof theADIRSaccelerationenvelope.(Seeearlier
discussionin "Algorithm.")
To determinethe acceptabilityof a particular
takeoff-rollperformance,aselectedacceleration-error
bandthat extends10percentaboveandbelowthe
referenceaccelerationcurvewasprogrammedforthe
flight tests.Thisbandis shownin figure24for the
ADIRSreferencecurveshownin figure22. Observe
that themeasuredalong-trackaccelerationexceeded
the +10-percent error band of the reference acceler-
ation several times during the course of the run. To
illustrate the problem, a segment of the discrete logic
signal that controlled the SAF's during the flight test
in figure 22 has been merged in time across the top
of figure 24. As shown, three abort SAF's flashed on
for approximately 1 sec, which resulted in distraction
and concern even though no actual acceleration prob-
lem existed. The videotape recorded during this run
verified that three abort SAF's had appeared briefly
on the display.
In figures 22 and 23, observe that had the acceler-
ation adjustment for matchup occurred about 1 sec
later, a small upward movement in the reference sig-
nal would have occurred and most likely would have
shifted the upper error band high enough to preclude
the three on-off abort SAF flashes. However, a large
downward excursion of the ADIRS signal at approx-
imately 34 sec (fig. 24) would probably have caused
a single flash of the abort SAF.
Figure 25 shows the concurrently measured (but
unused) acceleration signal from the TSRV body-
mounted z-axis accelerometer during the same run.
(See figs. 22 24.) Note that this signal did not have
large oscillations; if it had been used as the input
to the TOPMS algorithm for this run, the effect
of the wind and #r adjustments at 19 sec would
have been hardly noticeable. Further note that if
a +10-percent error band had been drawn for this
reference curve, the acceleration measured by the
body-mounted accelerometer would have been easily
contained within it.
The following two software patches, which were
coded and approved by safety personnel before the
flight, were temporarily installed in the TOPMS
software to alleviate the nuisance SAF problem that
occurred when the ADIRS acceleration measurement
was used to drive the TOPMS displays:
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Figure 25. Comparison of TOPMS reference and TSRV body-
mounted z-axis accelerations during a normal takeoff roll.
1. A digital counter prevented the appearance of an
abort SAF due to out-of-range, along-track ac-
celeration unless the signal remained out of range
during several consecutive (or nearly consecutive)
data samples (sample rate of 20 per sec).
2. The acceleration-error tolerance band was in-
creased from +10 to + 15 percent.
The out-of-range digital counter functioned as fol-
lows. A positive integer n was initially set to zero.
When the sampled acceleration-error value exceeded
the +10-percent error band in a computation cycle,
n advanced one count. If the acceleration signal was
still out of bounds on the next computation cycle,
n advanced another count; however, if the acceler-
ation signal was back inside the error band, n was
reduced one count. Experimental limits were ira-
posed on n; for example, if n-5 were this limit
(corresponding to the acceleration signal being out
of bounds for 0.25 sec), the TOPMS logic would ac-
tivate an abort SAF only when n- 5. It would re-
main at n - 5 until the acceleration signal was again
within bounds, whereupon n would drop back one
count toward zero. When n- 0, it remained there
unless another excursion occurred. The n values in-
vestigated were 5, 8, and 10. This technique yielded
improved results but did not eliminate all the SAF
nuisance flashing, even when n was set at 10.
The second software patch expanded the
acceleration-error band from 4-10 to +15 percent,
which would easily have contained the ADIRS ac-
celeration signal shown in figures 22 24. Together
the two fixes eliminated the nuisance SAF's triggered
by the ADIRS signal; the second fix alone prob-
ably would have been sufficient and was certainly
the moststraightforward.In retrospect,the revised
+15-percent limit may be just as appropriate as the
arbitrarily selected +10-percent limit. However, if an
airplane is equipped with a sensor package that deliv-
ers a reasonably well-filtered along-track acceleration
signal, the smaller band should be sufficient. Defin-
ing an optimal acceleration-error band was beyond
the scope of this investigation.
Figure 26 shows measured and reference acceler-
ation for a situation in which the spoilers were in-
tentionally deployed from the beginning of the take-
off roll. Note that as speed increased, the measured
acceleration fell below the reference curve (dashed
line) as expected. When the algorithm made its
check of the acceleration performance just after the
throttles were set for 3 sec, the measured accelera-
tion was about 0.5 ft/sec 2 below what it nominally
should have been for the measured throttle setting.
Accordingly, the algorithm changed #r and adjusted
the reference acceleration to the measured value at
this time. Subsequently, the abnormally increas-
ing aerodynamic drag due to the deployed spoilers
continued to cause the measured acceleration to de-
crease. At about 21 sec, the algorithm determined
that the measured acceleration error had exceeded
the ±10-percent limit and it switched on the abort
SAF. After the TOPMS Pilot briefly observed the
SAF, the run was declared complete and the Pilot
Flying lowered the spoilers and made a preplanned
takeoff.
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Figure 26. Comparison of reference and body-mounted
z-axis acceleration signals during takeoff with excess drag
(deployed spoilers).
Distance Determination Using Alternative
Methods
The TOPMS algorithm computed the TSRV run-
way positions throughout the flight-test series by
double integration of the pretakeoff-predicted (nom-
inal) and the real-time-measured (and filtered) ac-
celerations. (See fig. 7.) The TSRV positions were
referenced to a specified start point whose coordi-
nates were preestablished by land survey. During
postflight analysis, filtration and single integration of
the independently measured ground speed (method 2
in fig. 7) appeared to provide more accurate run-
way positioning. This was determined by compar-
ing distances-traveled data obtained by single inte-
gration of ground speed, by double integration of
acceleration, and by real-time range measurements
made with the Wallops Flight Facility ground-based
laser tracker. This tracker has a dynamic range accu-
racy of ±1.65 ft (standard deviation) and a pointing
accuracy of 0.3 mrad in azimuth. (See ref. 14.) Un-
fortunately, the laser tracker was available for only
part of one test day.
Because of the variability of flight-test conditions
and procedures (including early termination of some
runs and/or early cutoffs of data recorders), only
six normal takeoff runs had sufficiently complete
data sets for strict comparisons of the TSRV posi-
tions at V_; the TSRV was tracked by laser radar
in only two of these runs, which further restricted
comparative data. These data are shown in table V.
Table V. Measured and/or Computed
Positions of TSRV at VR
Run
3307
3441
3244
3133
2637
2645
Distance, ft
id a
113033
113467
113067
#2909
#2452
#2427
Sdgs
30(_8
3740
3248
3140
2631
2634
Idlt
2690
2696
*dp, algorithm-predicted distance from nominal
acceleration.
t da, algorithm-computed distance from measured
acceleration.
dgs, algorithm-computed distance from measured
ground speed.
_dlt , measured distance from radar laser tracker.
]1Acceleration signal from IMU.
#Acceleration signal from body-mounted accelerometer.
Runs 1 3 show results when the along-track acceler-
ation input to the TOPMS algorithm came from the
TSRV IMU. Runs 4 6 show similar data when the
input was obtained using the body-mounted, z-axis
accelerometer. No suitable along-track acceleration
input signals were obtained from the ADIRS unit.
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Figure 27. Comparison of laser-tracker-measured and TOPMS-computed positions of TSRV at VR.
A comparison of the computed and measured po-
sition data is shown in figures 27 29). In figure 27,
six groups of incremental differences in takeoff-roll
distances are shown across the bottom and the run
numbers common to each group are indicated along
the top. With the exception of run 2, the algorithm
method 1 computed values of takeoff-roll distances da
from the TSRV start points to the locations where its
airspeed reached V R were approximately 200 ft less
than pretakeoff-roll-predicted distances dp for nomi-
nal conditions. The magnitude of the differences cor-
responds roughly to two lengths of the TSF[V or less
than the distance it travels during the last second
before reaching VR. Part of the difference can be at-
tributed to #r being updated from the 0.015 assumed
nominal value to values ranging from 0.020 to 0.030.
Also, the wind inputs were adjusted 2 3 knots up-
ward in all but run 2, where no change occurred.
In runs 3 6, the method 2 computations of distance
traveled for the TSRV to reach VR (dgs) closely
agreed with pretakeoff predictions of V R positions;
method 1 computations showed only fair agreement.
Runs 1 and 2 provided mixed support of this trend.
In runs 5 and 6, dp and dgs compared well with the
respective laser-tracker measurements (dlt).
To provide additional insight, figures 28 and 29
present curve data of the TSRV runway positions
during runs 5 and 6, respectively, by using the com-
putational methods 1 and 2. In figure 28, the run 5
pretakeoff prediction (2637 ft) of where the TSRV
should reach a speed of VR under nominal condi-
tions is indicated by the dark circle. The laser-
tracker-measured distance at V R (2690 ft) is indi-
cated by the triangle. The solid and dashed lines
show corresponding positions using integration meth-
ods 1 and 2, respectively. Both curves end at the
location where CAS reaches VR. Similar data for
run 6 are shown in figure 29. Both sets of cur_ves ap-
pear to increase smoothly with airspeed, indicating
that the distance differences might be attributable to
the integration methods rather than any parameter-
correction anomalies. However, not enough data are
available to confirm the trend.
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Figure 28. Comparison of laser-tracker-measured and three
computed positions of TSRV during run 5 takeoff roll.
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Figure 29. Comparison of laser-tracker-measured and three
computed positions of TSRV during run 6 takeoff roll.
The method 1 versus method 2 pattern was
also apparent during a reduced-thrust takeoff from
the 2000-ft-altitude commercial runway at Asheville,
North Carolina, where no laser tracker was available.
(See fig. 30.) The circle at approximately 3000 ft
down the runway shows the pretakeoff prediction
based on the throttle setting that would produce a
scheduled EPR of 1.95. However, during this run,
the pilot purposely used a throttle setting that pro-
duced an EPR of 1.7. The resulting lower accelera-
tion level caused the CAS to increase at a slower pace
and, according to method 1, the TSRV reached VR
about 1000 ft farther down the runway than pre-
dicted at pretakeoff; when using method 2, the TSRV
position was about 1200 ft farther down the runway.
(Both curves terminate where CAS reaches VR.)
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Figure 30. Comparison of runway position computation meth-
ods 1 and 2 during reduced-thrust takeoff run.
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Figure 31. Roll distances before and braking distances after
abort at 80 knots.
Aborted Takeoffs
Two maximum-braking aborts were made during
tests at the Wallops Flight Facility. The primary
purpose was to compare the laser-tracker-measured
stopping distances versus the stopping distances
computed by the TOPMS algorithm using meth-
ods 1 and 2. Figures 31 and 32 show this com-
parison for maximum-braking stops from approxi-
mately 80 knots and 100 knots, respectively. The
winds were light for both runs so the CAS and
ground, speed values were approximately equal ....
At the beginning of the 80-knot situation (fig. 31),
#r -0.04 was entered as an intentional error, which
the algorithm corrected to #r- 0.016 at approxi-
mately 30 knots. At 80 knots, it took about 3 sec
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Figure 32. Roll distances before and braking distances after
abort at 100 knots.
for the TOPMS Pilot to call for the abort and for
the Pilot Flying to respond (i.e., hear the call, re-
duce the throttles, pull the speed-brake lever, and
apply the foot brakes); consequently, ground speed
reached approximately 86 or 87 knots before brak-
ing became the dominant longitudinal force. A com-
parison of airplane position during the takeoff roll
showed the same trend as seen during previous take-
offs (figs. 28 and 29); that is, the laser tracker de-
termined that the position of the airplane was ahead
of the TOPMS-computed position. Note that the
TOPMS computations and the laser measurements
of the braking distance correlated closely; the dis-
tance differential at the end of the run was about
the same as it had been at abort initiation. (The
runs were declared complete when speed was reduced
to about 15 knots because the TSRV antiskid brake
system ceased operation below this level.)
In the 100-knot situation, the Pilot Flying reacted
more quickly (in slightly less than 2 sec) and ground
speed reached only about 103 knots when full brag
ing was applied. Laser tracker measurements and
method 2 computations of braking distance agreed
closely; again, the laser tracker indicated that the
TSRV was slightly farther down the runway.
To add interest during another braking run at the
Wallops Flight Facility, the TOPMS Pilot covertly
selected the 2000-ft-to-go mark on his runway graphic
as a target stop point. Then without informing
the Pilot Flying of the purpose, the TOPMS Pi-
lot verbally instructed the Pilot Flying when to ap-
ply more or less braking. The Pilot Flying obliged
and the TSRV was brought to a stop as the nose of
the graphic airplane reached the target mark. The
TOPMS Pilot then asked the Safety Pilot to look out
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the side window and report where the airplane had
stopped. The TSRV had indeed come to a stop ap-
proximately opposite the 2000-ft-to-go marker sign
alongside the runway. Although this was not a
planned or rigorous test, it further demonstrated that
the TOPMS algorithm was providing reasonably ac-
curate distance information on dry runway surfaces.
Additional Discussion of TOPMS
Displays
The SAF's and predicted stop point x augment
the elemental, distributed TOPMS display with ira-
portant information concerning both system and ac-
celeration performance. For example, after an engine
failure, the pilot must quickly assess the seriousness
of the situation and decide whether the airplane can
be stopped in the remaining runway distance. A red
SAF would instantly advise the pilot that the air-
plane could probably be stopped; a green SAF would
indicate that it most likely could not. The predicted
stop-point symbol x would support the SAF in both
cases.
An EPR bar that rises to its target (scheduled)
mark, turns red, and does not diminish in length indi-
cates a serious mismatch between the measured EPR
and the EPR value associated with the measured
throttle position. A situation in which both engines
are operating with a serious EPR mismatch is illus-
trated in figure 19. In this figure, the shaded trian-
gle has advanced so far downfield that it has crossed
the GRLL. Two violations of TOPMS criteria that
have occurred (table IV) for continued takeoff are
a large EPR versus throttle-position EPI_ disagree-
ment and insufficient runway distance remaining for
a sanctioned takeoff. Either of these violations would
trigger an abort SAF. The following reM-world case
(ref. 15) illustrates this situation.
In January 1982, a heavily loaded Boeing
737-222 transport attempted to depart from the
Washington National Airport in a heavy snowstorm.
For several contributing reasons, the flight ended in a
fatal crash soon after liftoff. The runway length was
near minimum for the airplane under the existing
weather and loading conditions.
If a TOPMS like the one described in this re-
port had been operating aboard that aircraft, it
would have provided the pilots with the fojlowing
information:
1. Before beginning the takeoff roll, the pilot would
have set the throttles on zero deflection angle
for idle thrust, but the EPR bars on the dis-
play would have extended noticeably above their
usual zero length, which indicates that greater
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than idle thrust was being sensed. Engine sound
and other cockpit information, however, would
not have supported an above-idle-thrust situation
and would have alerted the crew of a potentially
serious problem.
. If this visual cue were ignored and the takeoff roll
begun, both EPR bars would have risen to their
respective target marks in response to the throt-
tle advances, which would have been lower than
normal. About 3 sec after the throttles were set
to match the target EPR marks on the display,
both EPR bars would have turned red but re-
tained their target length. Additionally, the algo-
rithm would have reacted to the large mismatch
between the target EPR and the EPR value as-
sociated with the sensed throttle position by im-
mediately causing an abort SAF and a predicted
stop-point x to appear on the runway graphic.
The shaded triangle would also have jumped far
down the runway indicating that measured accel-
eration was significantly lower than the nominal
expected for the ongoing maneuver.
. If the takeoff roll continued, the shaded triangle
would have soon crossed the GRLL (shown in
fig. 19), violating yet another abort criterion. (See
condition 7 in table III.)
A TOPMS display with lesser features (e.g.,
no SAF or x) would also have provided valuable in-
formation in the case described above but would not
have been as dramatic. The nominal-length red EPR
bars would have brought attention to the display; the
greatly separated triangles would have graphically
pointed out the magnitude of the low-acceleration
condition and the fact that the airplane might not
attain V_ before it reached the GRLL.
Inclusion of the SAF's in the TOPMS package
is not intended to reduce pilot responsibility in de-
ciding on a course of action (i.e., GO or NO-GO).
The SAF's provide an instant second opinion that
a problem that requires action may exist based on
the algorithm's logical analysis of existing paramet-
ric values and other data related to programmed cri-
teria. Whereas the SAF's may not be perceived as
top-priority (or necessary) information by highly ex-
perienced pilots (such as the TOPMS Pilot in this
study), the SAF's would provide valuable and timely
cues for less experienced pilots; the SAF's would
prompt them to immediately scan the supporting in-
formation to ascertain or verify a real or potential
problem and quickly decide on the appropriate con-
trol response (i.e., make the GO/NO-GO decision as
early as possible).
An alternative to the abort SAF in this situation
could be an acceleration-error indicator (e.g., the one
used in the TOPMS head-up display in the ref. 16
simulation study). Inclusion of either the abort SAF
or an acceleration-error indicator should facilitate
early investigation of the cause of the shaded triangle
displacement away from the predicted VR point (i.e.,
lower than nominal throttle setting, EPR-bias errors,
or excessive drag). The presence of either symbol (or
both) also relieves the pilot from having to closely or
continuously watch the shaded triangle.
For completeness, the amber SAF (table III and
fig. 16) was flight tested; however, it is being deleted
from the TOPMS for lack of sufficient pilot support
in this and in previous studies. (See ref. 11.)
Concluding Remarks
The Langley Takeoff Performance Monitoring
System (TOPMS) is a computer software and hard-
ware graphics system that visually displays current
runway position, acceleration performance, engine
status, and other situation advisory information to
aid pilots in their decision to continue or to abort
a takeoff. The TOPMS was successfully installed
and tested on the Transport System Research Ve-
hicle (TSRV), a highly modified Boeing 737-100 re-
search airplane. The navigation screen in the TSRV
r_:_search flight deck displayed TOPMS information
while the TSRV was on the runway; at liftoff, the
TOPMS display disappeared and normal navigation
information automatically returned to this screen.
Six days of runway testing consisting of 85 takeoff
or abort situations were conducted at five airfields
between March 1987 and November 1989.
The TOPMS runway tests indicated to the test
team that the simulator-developed TOPMS technol-
ogy had been successfully transferred to the TSRV.
The algorithm was easily installed on the TSRV reg-
ular graphics computer. It reliably calculated the
TSRV performance and accurately provided a graph-
ical display of the runway situation expected under a
variety of nominal and error conditions (i.e., induced
acceleration deficiencies; simulated engine failures;
and several runway, gross-weight, temperature, wind,
pressure, altitude conditions). The TOPMS also in-
terfaced well with other onboard equipment through
the airplane all-purpose, high-speed data bus.-
Although quantitative: data gathering was not
a primary test objective, some preliminary dis-
tance comparisons were extracted from recorded
flight data. In particular, the following trends were
observed:
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1. When roll distancesrequiredto reachtakeoff
speedVR were computed from accelerometer
measurements, they were typically two airplane
lengths less than (a) pretakeoff-predicted dis-
tances computed from nominal acceleration,
(b) distances measured by a ground-based laser
radar tracker, and (c) distances computed from
independently measured ground speed.
2. The computed and measured braking distances
appeared to be in better agreement than the
takeoff-roll distances; however, additional data
are needed to confirm this.
Based on the results of these runway tests, the
following recommendations concerning the TOPMS
algorithm and displays are listed:
1. A study should be made to determine the optimal
magnitude of the error band about the reference
acceleration to prevent unwarranted or nuisance
abort advisories. This study illustrated that a
+10-percent error band should be sufficient when
well-filtered, along-track accelerometer signals are
available; however, this error band may not ad-
equately encompass all of the possible nuisance
anomalies.
2. The #r-update feature could be removed be-
cause it appears to provide very little practical
benefit; in fact, in some instances, it may be
counterproductive.
3. The GO and NO-GO SAF's should be retained
as active elements of the TOPMS displays. The
TOPMS displays provide desirable basic per-
formance information without them, but they
appear to be a positive enhancement.
4. A good-quality measured ground-speed signal
when available on a particular airplane, should
be considered as the TOPMS input for the real-
time distance computation of the airplane po-
sition. This computational technique, however,
also needs more extensive study.
The TOPMS is operational and has been retained
on the TSRV for general use and demonstration. It
would, however, be desirable to demonstrate and
evaluate the TOPMS on another airplane with dif-
ferent characteristics, sensors, and support equip-
ment (e.g., a head-up display). The TOPMS soft-
ware could be adapted and used to advantage on any
modern airplane equipped with digital flight-control
computers.
NASA Langley Research Center
Hampton, VA 23681-0001
February 16, 1994
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